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LOOKING TO THE FUTURE OF MASS TORTS:
A COMMENT ON SCHUCK AND SILICLANO
FrancisE. McGovernt
Both Peter Schuck and John Siliciano suggest that the commonly
perceived "crisis" in mass torts mischaracterizes reality. Their respective analyses quite correctly reflect the amazingly adaptive and recuperative powers of the common-law tort system. This commentary on
the articles presented by Professors Schuck and Siliciano, rather than
critiquing their formidable arguments, builds on their papers and focuses on various prospects for future adaption and recuperation in
the world of mass torts. Will mass torts continue to inhabit the existing legal framework but in a mutated form, and, if so, what form?
Will the existing system be replaced altogether? Or, will we have a
combination of the above as multiple forces push for change and confront a perpetually malleable tort system?
PROFESSOR SILIGIANO
John Siliciano suggests that the problems raised by mass torts fall
into two categories: (1) problems that would exist under any compensation system or (2) problems common to all torts.1 A fundamental
issue facing us, he correctly asserts, is notjust a crisis in the tort system
but a failure to "focus on whether we wish to retain the [tort] system
at all."2
Professor Siliciano's observation prompts me to pose another
fundamental inquiry: If mass torts are nothing more than torts on a
mass scale, why aren't more torts like mass torts? If there are no "tortlike" differences between torts and mass torts, why aren't all torts
brought en masse? Moreover, why is a plaintiff with a possible mass
torts claim more likely to file suit than a plaintiff with a potential individual tort claim? There is reasonably reliable data that garden-variety
tort filings by injured plaintiffs represent between ten and twenty percent of the actionable tort cases that could be pursued in the litigation
t Francis H. Hare Professor of Torts, The University of Alabama School of Law.
Many thanks go to Peter Morgan, Steve Snyder, Patty Lovelady Nelson, Penny Gibson, and
Luke Richbourg for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1 SeeJohn Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of CDis, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 990, 991
(1995).
2 Id. at 1009.
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system.3 Studies of randomly selected medical files by neutral physicians reveal that for every 100 files that contain evidence of medical
malpractice, only ten resorted to the tort system. 4 Other studies suggest that .3% of all persons who are injured file a tort action.5
Although the reasons for this underreporting and underfiling of
tort claims are quite complex, they include several factors that appear
to be intuitively correct. When injuries are private, such as a fall in a
bathroom, as opposed to public, such as an automobile accident on a
busy roadway, there is less likelihood of a law suit being filed.6 Potential claimants who view themselves as less likely to be received warmly
by the litigation process-minorities and women, for example-are
less likely to file suit.7 Those who tend to ascribe causation of harms
to natural forces or to themselves, or those who are not eager to invest
in obtaining the information necessary to substantiate a claim, are also
less prone to litigate. 8 In addition, there is a host of social and behavioral barriers as well as substantial information costs that impede access to the tort system. 9
The opposite phenomenon seems to occur, however, in mature
mass torts; 10 it is quite likely that in excess of 100% of the genuinely
actionable claims are pursued. In the Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, by the time the A.H. Robins Company filed for bankruptcy in
August of 1985, nearly 10,000 cases had been resolved by trial or set3

For a comprehensive analysis of the data on claiming behavior, see DEBORAH R.

HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 109-39
(1991). Other frequently cited studies of claiming rates include ALFRED F. CoNARD ET AL.,
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COsTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964); PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC
PoLIcY (1985); DONALD HARRIS Er AL, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY
(1984); HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990); ROGER

B. HUNTING & GLORIA S. NELWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEw YORK Criy? A STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS (1962); EuzABET SPRINKEL, ATrORNEY INVOLVEMENT IN AUTO INJURY
CLAIMS (1988); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOWUP REPORT ON NO-FAULT INSURANCE EXPERIENCES (1985); Rich-

ard Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15
LAw & Soc. REv. 525 (1980-81).
4 See sources cited supra note 3.
5 See sources cited supra note 3.
6 See sources cited supra note 3, in particular the discussions in HENSLER E- AL. and
HARRIS Er At

See sources cited supra note 3.
8 See sources cited supra note 3.
9 See sources cited supra note 3.
10 Mass tort litigation has matured "where there has been full and complete discovery,
multiplejury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaindti' contentions. Typically at the
mature stage, little or no new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review of
any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at least one full cycle of trial strategies has
been exhausted." Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Torts, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659,
659 (1989).
7
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tdement, and approximately 6,000 cases were pending.'" Thus the tort
system had captured roughly 15,000 cases during the fifteen plus year
history of the litigation. When the bankruptcy court approved a deadline for filing any additional cases against A.H. Robins over 300,000
claims were received. 12 Approximately 100,000 claims were dismissed
for failure to comply with procedural guidelines or because of a lack
of continued interest in the litigation, and almost 85,000 claims were
settled for approximately $725 apiece.' 3 One could argue that these
data suggest that a maximum of 115,000 claims were of tort-litigation
calibre. This argument suggests that the tort system found less than
fifteen percent of the actionable torts, but when Dalkon Shield became a mass tort, more than 200% of those claims were made. The
phenomenon of unmeritorious claims is exacerbated by the generally
accepted belief that there are significant numbers of false positive
cases currently filed in "normal" torts. In the same study of medical
malpractice referenced above, the researchers found that only seventeen percent of the plaintiffs who actually entered the tort system had
4
valid claims.1
The Dalkon Shield litigation is not unique in this regard. In the
Hyatt Skywalk cases, more people filed claims than there were people
who could have possibly been in virtually every hotel in Kansas City.' 5
The number of asbestos claims, including massive false-positive filings,
is likewise legion. 16 In any number of toxic soup cases, there will
7
often be modest initial filings followed by substantial overreporting.'
Many of the behavioral, social, and economic impediments to accessing the tort system are alleviated in the context of mass torts.
When the tort becomes public, plaintiffs become more fungible,
which reduces the importance of demographics. Personal responsibility shifts to defendant responsibility, and information becomes more
available. The trend then leads to overclaiming rather than
underclaiming.
11

McGovern, supra note 10, at 676; see asoRICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE

STORY OF THE DALKON SHIEL

BANKRuPrTcy (1991).

12

McGovern, supra note 10, at 677.
13 Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: ParadigmLost (orFound)?,61
FoRDHaM L. RFv. 617, 633 (1992).
14

See sources cited supra note 3.

15

See Symposium, A Case Study in Mass Disaster Litigation, 52 UMKC L.REv. 151

(1984).

16 Deborah K Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass PersonalInjury Litigation: A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROoi. L. REV. 961 (1993); Deborah 1K Hensler, A GlassHalf
Full A GlassHalfEmpty: The Use ofAlternative DisputeResolution in MassPersonalInjury Litigation, 73 TEx. L Ray. 1115 (1995).
17 Francis E. McGovern, The AlabamaDDT SettlementFund, 53 LAw & CoNTraaMP. PROBS.
61 (1990).
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Will this trend of overclalming become infectious as more mass
torts are discovered and the rate of claiming for all torts increases
such that more torts will become "mass"? Will we, as a society, appreciate the unappreciated secret of the tort system-underutilization
rather than overutilization-which could drive the tort system into an
era of unmanageability by overuse? Will the tort system succeed in
capturing all compensable harms and then fall of its own tort-induced
weight?
PROFESSOR SCHUCK
Peter Schuck, while pursuing his elegant thesis of "institutional
evolution," provides us with the seeds of answers to these inquiries. 18
Professor Schuck observes that many of the "problems" with mass torts
raised by commentators are dated, that is, directed at a mass tort
world that no longer exists. 19 Such a lag between analysis and reality
is not unique to mass torts. 20 He suggests that there has been significant "incremental system building" involving lawyers, loss and risk
spreading, and judicial management, and that claim values and global
settlements have moderated and mediated excesses in mass tort litigation.2 1 The common-law process, he argues, has developed methodologies for handling mass torts that may, from a public policy
perspective, be superior to other governing processes. 22 Finally, he
suggests that this "natural" selection among institutional designs has
created an admittedly eclectic but functioning system that compares
favorably to the alternatives of collective claims processing, a market
in tort claims and administrative compensation. 23 Reminiscent of Calabresi's Torts: The Law of the Mixed Society,24 Professor Schuck presents
the notion that critical commentary on mass torts has become outdated by an often messy and inelegant, but politically acceptable, process for coping with mass torts.
To return to our inquiry of whether all torts will be brought en
masse and create potentially unsupportable pressures on the tort system, Professor Schuck's institutional evolution thesis can be pushed to
provide some insight. He is purposefully conservative in describing at
least two areas of institutional change: (1) the plaintiffs' bar 25 and (2)
18 See Peter A. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspective, 80 CoRNEt
L. Ruv. 941 (1995).
19 Id. at 942-44.
20
21

Id.
Id. at 950-51.

22
23

Id. at 974-75.
Id. at 980, 988-89.

24
25

Guido Calabresi, Torts: The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 Tzx. L. RFv. 519 (1978).
See Schuck, supra note 18, at 951-53, 955-56.
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the judiciary.2 6 There is great support for the notion that an innovative segment of the plaintiffs' bar has developed a new generation of
law firms that are evolving into investment engines for mass torts. Asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and other mass torts have provided the funding, the incentive and, arguably, the necessity for the creation of
institutional structures unknown in the traditional plaintiffs' bar.
Large plaintiffs' firms, national plaintiffs' firms, extensive cooperation
and networking, and investment pools for risk and profit sharing are
quite new, at least in the tort world. Borrowed from the securities and
antitrust bars and fed by an enormous pool of plaintiffs with compensable harms and by huge returns on investment, there is currently a
virtual stampede of plaintiffs' lawyers into this "mass" world.
It seems inevitable that, once created, these "mass" institutions
will demand to be used. The traditional filtering function of plaintiffs' lawyers-selecting only those cases for the tort system that will
individually justify punishment-has evaporated. Why try 2,000 cases
when 8,500 cases can just as easily be resolved?27 The incentive has
changed; the more the better. "Massness" is good, not bad. The future is in Albuterol, Norplant, RSI, tobacco, and Persian Gulf
28
chemicals.
At the same time, as Professor Schuck notes, there has been an
equally notable evolution in judicial attitudes toward accommodating
mass torts. 29 At the state level, a committee of the Conference of
Chief Justices-the Mass Tort Litigation Committee (MTLC) -has
been created to promote information sharing among state trial judges
confronting mass torts. MTLC meets several times a year and invites
academics, lawyers, federal judges, and other judges to join in their
discussions. There appears to be an eagerness on the part of some
judges to create new methodologies ofjudicial management to facilitate access to the courts. If it is possible to resolve large numbers of
cases, so the argument goes, it must be possible to resolve huge numbers of cases. Again, why try 2,000 cases when 8,500 cases can just as
easily be resolved?3 0 Waiving filing fees, providing forums that are
26
27

Id. at 956-58.
Consolidation file No. 89-236704, In re Baltimore City Personal Injury and Wrong-

ful Death Asbestos Cases, (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City, Apr. 24, 1990) (order granting consolidation);Julie G. Shoop, Massive Asbestos Trial Opens in Baltimore,TRIAL, May 1992, at 98; see
alZso MD. R. Civ. P. (eff.July 1, 1990).
28 Milo Geyelin & Tom Knudson, Law Firm'sAds Pursue Usersof Rezalled Drug, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 3, 1994, at B1;Julie Brienza, Norplant Suits Multiplying,TRIAL, OCt. 1994, at 17;John
P. Engen, Apple, IBM and RST Go to Court, S.F. EXAMNER, Jan. 22, 1995, at CS; Glenn Collins, JudgeAllows Big Suit On Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al; Coleman v.
Alcolac, Inc., Civ. A. No. G-94-415 (S.D. Tex. June 6, 1995) (order on motion to dismiss)
(class action of veterans of the Persian Gulf War).
29 See Schuck, supra note 18, at 947, 956-58.
30 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

19951

THE FUTURE OF MASS TORTS

1027

conveniens, creating pretrial consolidation to reduce discovery costs,
and using class action or common issue trials to reduce litigation expenses are but a few of the techniques that some courts have used to
increase case resolutions.3 '
This confluence of lawyer institutions to generate cases and of
judicial institutions to resolve cases has altered the historic barriers to
entry into the tort system. 3 2 No longer, if this trend continues, will
there be few mass torts and ten to twenty percent filing rates. Instead,
every tort could be a mass tort.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Is this trend toward increased filings of both meritorious claims
and unmeritorious claims good or bad? Normative judgments will
probably be in the eyes of the beholder. The more neutral issue for
the tort process observer is what a progressive and substantial increase
in the volume of tort cases will do to the overall system. To follow
Professor Schuck's critique of the critics, what will this mean for the
future? Will these institutional engines generate so much speed that
they run off the tort tracks? Will we move to alternative processes to
resolve cases? Will we retrench in a d0"d vu movement, or will we continue to muddle through? Will the continued transmogrification of
the tort system be ephemeral or perpetual? Functioning crystal balls
being in scarce supply, perhaps several visions or dreams or nightmares are in order.
Rapid Evolution: The United Nations Compensation Commission
One vision of the future suggests that we will continue to push
the envelope of new procedures, not at warp speed, but certainly into
new dimensions. This vision can be illustrated by the United Nations
Compensation Commission (UNCC). Its task has been to resolve
some 2.5 million claims totaling $160 billion with a staff of less than
100 over a period of three to five years.
The UNCC was created by the United Nations Security Council in
1991 to resolve claims for reparation arising from the Iraq-Kuwait con31

28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988);Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex.

1985), affd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Complex Asbestos Iltig. (Cal. Sup. Ct., City
and County of San Francisco June 21, 1985) (General Order No. 29 Re: New Filings);
Alfaro v. Dow Chem., 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied,498 U.S. 1024 (1991); Turley
v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. et al., No. 84-C-3321 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawla County, W. Va.
Feb. 17, 1989).
32 Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 Txx. L. REv. 1821
(1995).
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flict in 1990.33 The UNCC consists of a Secretariat led by an Executive
4
Director with policy guidance provided by a Governing Council.3
The Governing Council, upon the Secretariat's recommendation, appoints separate commissioners to decide the validity of claims filed by
nations either on their own behalf or on behalf of their citizens. The
UNCC is neither a classic reparations program, such as those negotiated after World War II, nor a classic international arbitration program, such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Under the traditional
reparations model, a fixed amount of money is placed in a closed-end
fund that is administered and allocated by the recipient nation.
Under the UNCC system the amount of money to be allocated to reparations is open-ended and administered by an international entity.
Under traditional arbitration the amount of money to be allocated is
not typically restricted and the affected parties participate in allocation decisions. In the UNCC there is a less significant role for the
payor nation, thereby the payor nation has limiting adversariness in
the determination of monies available for distribution. The UNCC
model is, then, an open-ended fund financed by Iraq and administered inquisitorially by an international body.3 5
Building on international innovations in mass tort resolution, the
UNCC has adopted a series of alternative methodologies for filing and
resolving claims. The concept is like the approach contained in the
Manualfor Complex Litigation.3 6 The Manual gives judges a menu of
options for managing complex litigation and allows them to tailor
procedures for each case rather than forcing judges to follow a single,
predetermined process.
The UNCC has provided different procedures and processes for
different types of claims. It allows claimants to select the type of claim
they wish to file rather than mandating a single procedure selected by
the claims facility.37 Thus a person who does not wish to provide extensive proof or to undergo a lengthy decisionmaking process may
select a payment option that is more rapid, albeit with less compensation, and based upon less scrutiny. People desiring higher awards, on
the other hand, can choose a payment option that requires greater
proof and more extensive review but may result in a larger payment.
The common thread among the UNCC options is found in a hierar33
THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUiUM (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE UNrrED NATIONS COMPENSATION
COMMISSION].

34
35

Id.
Id.

36

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LTmGATION

37

UNrIED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, PROVISIONAL RULES FOR CLAIMS PRO(1992) [hereinafter PROVISIONAL RULES FOR CLAIMS PROCEDURE].

cEDURE

(Second) (1985).
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chy of value placed upon information: the more proof a person can
38
provide, the greater the compensation that person may receive.
Focusing on Professor Siliciano's fundamental concern regarding
what compensation system is most appropriate for mass torts, the
UNCC has made explicit trade-offs in the classic allocation dilemma: time, expense, or quality-pick any two. The Governing
Council and Secretariat have decided to err on the side of timeliness
in processing smaller claims, seeking to resolve these claims as rapidly
as possible consistent with acceptable accuracy. Larger claims, however, are be handled more traditionally with a corresponding increase
in time and cost. The UNCC has divided the claims into six categories: "A," "B," and "C"-claims that call for expedited resolution
based upon limited information-and "D," "E," and "F"-claims that
are to be handled more traditionally.3 9
The "A" claim forms request only a limited amount of information and are for people who departed Iraq or Kuwait during the conflict.40 No information is requested beyond the claim form itself, and
countries actually submit the "A" claims in a computerized format to
facilitate processing. The amount of money that can be awarded for
each claim varies from $2,500 to $8,000, but there is no aggregate
limit on the total value of all "A" claims. Approximately 900,000 "A"
41
claims have been filed.
The theory behind the "A" claims is that large numbers of people
deserve to receive relatively small sums of money for having been subjected to the trauma associated with their dislocation. The general
approach is for rough justice in the processing of "A" claims with low
levels of proof required and generous criteria for recovery established
by the Governing Council and applied by the commissioners. The
methodology the UNCC has adopted for resolving the "A" claims is a
rules-based decision-tree model with database verification from multiple sources. 42 The commissioners have made a number of generic
decisions which can be applied to large numbers of claims via a series
of inquiries or rules devised to filter claims. If a claim meets the criteria established by the rules, an award will be made. Claims that do not
satisfy the first series of inquires go on to a second series of inquiries
38

EjAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW (1982).
The data concerning the status of UNCC claims and procedures can be found in
the various reports made in accordance with Article 16, PROVISIONAL RULES FOR CLAIMS
PROCEDURE, supranote 37, Decision No. 10, as adopted by decision of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission taken at the 27th meeting, June 26,
1992.
40 United Nations Compensation Commission, Individual Claim Form, Form A.
41 Francis E. McGovern, The IntellectualHeritageof Claims Processingat the United Nations
Compensation Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note
33, at 187.
39

42

Id.
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to determine eligibility. After a claim has gone through all the
branches of the "A" claim decision tree, it is possible to filter out
claims that do not qualify. In addition, the commissioners use various
sampling techniques to apply the decisions in claims that have been
individually examined to those that have not.
The second option is the "B" claims program for claims involving
serious personal injury or death.4 3 Only 5,348 "B" claims have been
filed.4 Although the total value of "B" claims is open ended, payment
to any single claimant is limited to between $2,500 and $10,000, and
the transaction costs and the time allotted for processing claims has
been reduced. The information each claimant must provide is limited, although supplemental material may be provided. In formulating this approach, the Governing Council assumed that there was
responsibility for personal injury or death to noncombatants caused
by the conflict and established a rigid payment scale. It did not, however, assume causation in every case and left the task of determining a
causal relationship between the conflict and the harm in each case to
the "B" commissioners. Like the "A" claims, the decisionmaking process for "B" claims is inquisitorial, although the proof level is somewhat higher for "B" claims than for "A" claims.
Decisionmaking in the "B" claims more closely resembles case
matching.45 The Secretariat has taken the claims and organized them
by outcome-determinative issue, creating large groups of cases. The
Secretariat has then presented the issues to the commissioners for resolution not in the abstract, as with "A" claims, but in the context of an
actual claim or claims. Once a "test" case is resolved, the Secretariat
matches its holding to similar unresolved cases. The commissioners
are then given groups of like claims to determine whether the outcomes are consistent and individually correct. The luxury of this individual case examination is possible in "B" claims because of their
relatively small number. The Secretariat and commissioners have selected more traditional decisionmaking approaches when time and resources permit.
The third option, "C" claims, are quite different. Up to $100,000
can be awarded and claims can recover damages for departure, personal injury, death, personal property loss, lost securities, lost income,
real property damage, and individual business losses. 4 6 Over
1,600,000 "C" claims have been filed.4 7 The total amount of money
that can be awarded for all "C" claims is open ended as is the amount
43
44
45
46

47

United Nations Compensation Commission, Individual Claim Form, Form B.
See supra note 39.
See McGovern, supra note 41.
United Nations Compensation Commission, Individual Claim Form, Form C.
See supra note 39.

19951

THE FUTURE OFMASS TORTS

1031

of information that can be provided to support a "C" claim. Because
the error costs are higher than in "A" and "B" claims, more complex
scrutiny is given to "C" claims. Again, the Governing Council assumed
liability but left issues of causation and damage amount to be determined by the "C" commissioners.
Also, unlike the "A"and "B" claims, the types of supporting documentation provided for "C" claims vary considerably. It is not unusual
to find absolutely no documentation to support some claims, while
unsubstantiated lists of information, incomplete third-party documents, or fully complete third-party proof may be provided to support
others. One would certainly expect that the circumstances of departure might overtake the demands of gathering documentary evidence
of loss. Yet, the commissioners have an obligation to dispense funds
based upon a reasoned process, not to act as a relief agency.
The "C" claims are the most complex of the three categories of
rapidly processed claims: their number is daunting, their variations
are extreme; and the stakes are high. 48 As might be expected, the
Secretariat has approached these claims with a significant degree of
flexibility, and the commissioners have been quite innovative in devising various decisionmaking methodologies. The departure claims, for
example, have been handled consistent with the "A" claims using a
computerized decision-tree model. The personal injury and death
claims, at least in the first installment, have been decided using case
matching as with the "B" claims. The personal property and lost income sections have been resolved with a combination of rule-based
decisions, regression analysis, and independent verification. Real
property and individual business losses have been decided almost on a
case-by-case basis with some case matching to ensure consistency.
The most interesting and compelling use of innovative claimshandling processes will occur when the Secretariat and commissioners
move from the first installment of 2,848 claims to subsequent and
much larger installments. If all the "C" claims are to be decided in a
timely fashion without an enormous increase in staff and commissioners, use of random and representative samples, common-issue extrapolation, statistical analysis (including regression modeling), and
perhaps even expert systems must increase. 49
"D" claims are identical to the "C" claims except that there is no
cap on the amount of individual awards. 5 0 Because priority has been
given to "A," "B," and "C" claims, there has been little analysis of the
8,288 "D" claims filed thus far.5 1 However, there will likely be substan-

50

See McGovern, supra note 41.
See McGovern, suPranote 41.
United Nations Compensation Commission, Individual Claim Form, Form D.

51

See supranote 89.

48
49
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tial similarity between the processing of "C" and "D" claims with more
extensive scrutiny for higher awards.
Resolving "E" (corporate) claims and "F" (governmental) claims
will likely involve more traditional litigation or arbitration modes5 2 because both time and resource constraints on resolution are less severe. 5 3 It is possible, however, to contemplate the use of some hybrid
techniques developed in "A," "B," and "C" claims to resolve both single and multiple claims.
"D~dj Vu All Over Again": PrivateRationing
A second vision of the future arises from an analogy with the recent health care reform debate. Americans are particularly fond of
the fiction that they can receive infinite amounts of health care when
they are, or fear they might be, sick. We still carry an image of teams
of physicians armed with the latest biomedical technology, albeit no
longer with Marcus Welby demeanor, squeezing out the last drop of
life for those in need. Yet the recent health care debate revealed not
only that this image was inconsistent with reality, but also that fortyone million Americans lived without any health care insurance in
1993.54 When confronted with this reality and the costs associated
with rectifying the gap between the image and reality, our representative government could not decide on a course of action.5- 5 Rather
than face the explicit economic burdens associated with providing
assistance for all, by default we favored the implicit funding of health
care through less obvious economic transfers or cost shifting between
insureds and uninsureds. Rather than face an overt or explicit rationing of health care, we decided to keep our rationing private and
implicit.56
One could argue that an analogous decisionmaking process is
emerging in our justice system. There is little doubt that publicprivate rationing exists in our criminal law system. Justice for O.J.
52

United Nations Compensation Commission, Individual Claim Form, Forms E and

53

See PROVISIONAL RuLES FOR CLAIMS PROCEDURE, supranote 37.

F.
54 Employee Benefit Research Institute, Sources of Health Insuranceand Characteristicsof
the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 1994 CurrentPopulationSurvey, EBRI SPECIAL REP. SR-28
(Feb. 1995).
55 David Blumenthal, Health Care Reform-Past and Future, 332 N. ENG. J. MED. 465,
465-68 (1995).
56 ROBERT H. BLANK,RATIONING MEDICINE 27 (1988); see also id. at 77-134 (chapter 3,
"The Allocation and Rationing of Medical Care"). Most health policy analysts believe that
explicit rationing is inevitable, and as E. Haavi Morreim put it, "Somehow a distinction
must be made between what physicians are expected to do for their patients and the ways
in which resources are allocated." E. Haavi Morreim, Rationing and the Law, in RATIONING
AMEmcA's MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 163 (Martin A. Strosberg et al.
eds., 1992).
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Simpson does not look at all like justice for typical plea bargainers.
This observation is not intended as a normative judgment concerning
either the process or the outcome of individual cases, it is simply to
state-just as Peter Schuck has attempted to remain descriptive-that
our public image of criminal justice often diverges from reality. As
Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt have described in Tragic Choices,57 societies are forced to define themselves by their fictions and their
choices in the allocation of limited resources, and we have made our
choices.
The analogous, popularly accepted image of the tort process as
providing an indefatigable plaintiffs' lawyer for each injurious wrong
is also flawed. The bulk of the cost of tortious risk taking and injury
causing activity has remained in the private realm-with those
harmed. This occurs because of the previously described underutilization of the tort system by injured persons. The predictable outcome
of this phenomenon is that costs imposed by tortfeasors are borne by
those harmed rather than by tortfeasors themselves. In the context of
mass torts, the reality of underclaiming has now become public. One
issue facing us is whether we will, as a society, confront this reality or
recoil at the potential expense to tortfeasors or to the public for all
claims and return to our earlier fiction. In other words, will the institutions that have been most successful in stimulating mass filings ironically lead to a legal retrenchment that will inhibit future mass torts?
Certainly defendants have attempted to overrule court decisions
favorable to plaintiffs by recourse to legislatures. Their success rate,
however, has been somewhat limited except in the area of medical
malpractice. There are, however, a hiumber of pending legislative
proposals, applicable to virtually all torts, that would raise the access
and transaction costs for plaintiffs' counsel and, at the same time,
lower potential recoveries. 58 There are also judges who have decided
to limit the velocity of case dispositions by requiring a controlled flow
of individual trials or who have attempted to reduce potential recoveries by restricting punitive damages. 59 If the "elasticity" of mass
torts-the amenability of a tort, in accordance with the applicable substantive law and procedure to be expanded in scope, and the tendency of more plaintiffs to file suit as the case disposition rate
increases and transaction costs decrease-is contained and if plaintiffs' lawyers are forced to engage in more rigorous case selection, we
57
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could return to our more traditional world of tort litigation. 60
Whether the proponents of this type of change fully appreciate the
dynamics of mass torts sufficiently to accomplish such a retrenchment
remains to be seen.
All of the Above
A third vision of the future is "all of the above." We are in transition, so the argument goes, and there will inevitably be modifications
that restrict or expand liability and that nurture traditional and novel
mechanisms for resolving tort claims. Such modifications are based
not only upon the strategies of the immediate players, but also on
externalities derived from currently unrecognized and unpredictable
61
exogenous forces.
The area of subrogation, for example, is driving some changes
that may be quite far reaching. In the silicone gel breast implant
cases, a consortium of health care entities and the U.S. government in
its capacity as a health insurer have sought to intervene in the proposed global settlement in order to recover health care payments previously made to implant recipients. 62 The consortium has also offered
to assist the plaintiffs, both legally and financially, in obtaining recoveries from the defendants. This strategy is driven by the practical difficulties associated with obtaining subrogation recoveries for previously
expended health care costs. If the consortium of health care entities
could work together with the personal injury plaintiffs to establish a
common fund, this fund could be used both to compensate plaintiffs
and to reimburse health care entities. Needless to say, neither the
plaintiffs nor the defendants have been very receptive to this proposal
since it would divert the flow of money out of their respective pockets.
One could, however, quite readily envision a scenario where the financial pressures on the private and public health care industries could
lead to a governmentally assisted expansion of mass torts in order to
(1) eliminate the double recoveries for plaintiffs that as a practical
matter are currently available under most tort law and (2) transfer the
costs of medical expenses from the health care industry to tortious
defendants.
An unusual alliance is similarly evolving between workers' compensation insurance carriers and plaintiffs' lawyers. In instances
McGovern, supra note 32.
61 In hindsight virtually all outcomes are predictable. In the area of products liability
the more conservative trend in substantive law opinions documented by Professors Henderson and Eisenberg was certainly predictable, but very few people actually predicted the
trend. SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37 UCIA L R-v. 479 (1990).
62 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, 0V94-P11558-S, MDL No. 926, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
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where an employee sues a third party for personal injury and the
workers' compensation carrier seeks to recoup payments made to the
employee pursuant to its workers' compensation coverage, mutually
acceptable arrangements have been made whereby the carrier agrees
to provide a financial benefit to the injured employee and plaintiff's
lawyer if they are successful. The financial incentives accompanying
these types of arrangements could either encourage plaintiffs' lawyers
to file more lawsuits because of the additional compensation they may
receive or deter them from doing so by raising the threshold of the
potential recovery for their clients.
Other related activities by the plaintiffs' bar could also drive an
expansion or a contraction of tort liability. There is little question
that some plaintiffs' lawyers have become quite wealthy and that they
are willing to use that wealth in political forums. At the same time,
other plaintiffs' lawyers have been emulating the success of their peers
by filing cases in areas of tort law other than personal injury. In Alabama, for example, we have seen so-called boutique plaintiffs' lawyers-those who have traditionally handled one case at a time and
only cases that had the potential for substantial individual damagesmove first into mass personal injury torts and then mass consumer
torts.63 Recent class actions have been filed involving consumer financial arrangements that potentially involve substantial amounts in controversy. 64 Whether or not the vested interests of the plaintiffs' bar
will become so large that any counterattack by defendants would be
futile or that their success will breed an adverse reaction remains to be
seen.
On the conceptual front, there is the counterintuitive possibility
of an alliance between the law and economics tort theoreticians and
the traditional or non-class action plaintiffs' bar.6 5 Although there
may be a distinct difference of opinion between these two groups on
the issue of the distribution of income, on matters such as efficiency,
elitism, and populism there may be an unanticipated agreement that
could lead them to become ideological allies. The law and economics
concept of a marketplace of litigation with a multitude of discrete tri63
Princess Nobels v. Associates Corp. of N. Am., No 94-T-699N (M.D. Ala. 1995);
Annie E. Erkins v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., No. 94-03629-W (Cir. Ct. Jefferson Co. Ala.
1995); Maurice L Shevin, Chaos in the ConsumerFinanceIndusty in Alabama, 48 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. RE'. 313 (1994);JudgeSaysMillions CanJoinActionOver ContactLenses, WALL ST.J.,
Nov. 2, 1994, at B4 (Bausch & Lomb, Inc.).
64 Laurie P. Cohen, Lawyer Gets Investors to Sue GE, Prndentialin PoorBorder Town, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at Al; Consumer Class Actions: An Emerging Remedy, EMOND & Vnqms
Rnv.,Jan. 1995, at 1; Food of Lawsuits ThreateningIndustpy,ADAA NEws, Sept./Oct. 1994, at
1; NationsBank Pays $6.2 Million to Settle Suit; ORLANDo SruNL, Jan. 28, 1995, at C1.
65
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F.Sd 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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als that will set efficient values for cases is not inconsistent with the
plaintiffs' counsel view of open access to courts and unlimited trials.
At the same time there is arguably a common thread in allowing the
most populist of all governmental institutions-the jury-to resolve
tort litigation rather than by having more elite institutions, such as an
administrative agency, make compensation decisions. Thus, there
may be quite a cacophony in the theoretical underpinnings of what
has traditionally been a plaintiffs-to-the-left and defendants-to-theright debate over tort reform.
Likewise, there may be a historically unusual alliance between defendants and class action plaintiffs' counsel over the use of class actions. On the one hand, defendants are generally opposed to the use
of class actions for trial purposes, but, on the other hand, defendants
have become increasingly supportive of the use of class actions for
settlement purposes. This asymmetry reflects the defendants' efforts
to reduce the elasticity of mass torts and to contain them from expansion. At the same time the class action device can provide finality and
commercially valued predictability for corporate defendants.
Whether or not it will be feasible for defendants to increase the scope
and reach of class actions for settlement purposes without a corresponding strengthening in the use of class actions for trial is an issue
that is currently before the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Proposed legislation and efforts like the American
Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project to promote the aggregation of claims do not seem to generate as much current interest. At
the state level, however, there is a movement to facilitate the consolidation of mass tort cases at least for pretrial and docket control
purposes.
There is a saying that "you can't see the bottom of the creek until
the hogs get out of the water." The situation is indeed murky, and
predictions, albeit enjoyable, are quite dangerous, particularly if you
are a minnow.

